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INTRODUCTION 
This Court should reverse the Labor Commission's Order, and hold that Ms. 
Acosta had no duty to simultaneously file her occupational disease claim with her 
industrial accident claim. The Utah legislature has purposely kept these causes of 
action separate, along with maintaining separate requirements for each, and 
providing for separate compensation. The statute does not require injured workers 
to simultaneously file these claims. The Labor Commission failed to recognize 
that these claims are separate, and dismissed Ms. Acosta's occupational disease 
claim based on the doctrine of claim preclusion. Claim preclusion does not bar 
litigation of separate unlitigated claims that arise from separate statutes. This 
Court should reverse the Labor Commission, and remand Ms. Acosta's 
occupational claim for a hearing on the merits. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction iii 
Table of Contents iv 
Table of Authorities v 
Statement of Jurisdiction vi 
Statement of the Issue vi 
Standard of Review vii 
Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules vii 
Statement of the Case vii 
Facts x 
Summary of Argument xii 
Argument 1 
Conclusion 16 
Certificate of Service 17 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c), (d), and (e) vi 
Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991) vii 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101, et. seq vii, xii, xiii, 4, 7, 8, 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et. seq vii, viii, ix, xii, xiii, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15 
Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 3, 11, 13 
Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (Utah 1939) 4 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 
612 (Utah 1948) 4 
SMP v. Kirkland, Inc., 843 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah App. 1992) 5 
Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F. 2d 125 (1971) 6 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 115 Utah 451, 205 P.2d 541 
(1949) 8 
Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm 'n, 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 
1987) 8 
Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 2000) 12 
Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc., 529 N.E.2d 1255, (Ohio 1988) 14 
v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Ms. Acosta's appeal because the Labor 
Commission has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution, namely, Ms. 
Acosta's occupational disease claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c). This 
Court also has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Labor Commission has 
erroronously interpreted or applied the law in denying Ms. Acosta's occupational 
disease claim. Id. at § 16(4)(d). Finally, this Court also has jurisdiction to hear 
Ms. Acosta's appeal because the Labor Commission has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision making process or has failed to follow prescribed procedure, 
to the extent it has determined as a matter of Labor Commission policy that 
occupational disease claims must be filed simultaneously with industrial accident 
claims when they apply to the same employer. Id. at § 16(4)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue in this case is whether an unlitigated claim for occupational 
disease, which arose under a separate statute, based on previously unlitigated 
material facts, and which was filed within the appropriate statute of limitations, 
was erroneously dismissed under the judicial doctrine of res judicata. 
vi 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the Labor Commission's Order under a correction 
of error standard because it is a question of general law and the agency's decision 
making or procedure. Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n. 817 P.2d 316 
(Utah 1991). In that case, the Supreme Court stated that under UAPA, "agency 
determinations of general law . . . are to be reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision." Id. at 317. This Court 
should give no deference to the Labor Commission's decision because it is simply 
the agency's interpretation of general law. 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101, et. seq., "The Utah Occupational Disease 
Act,"orthe"UODA." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et. seq., "The Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act,"orthe"UWCA." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner/Appellant, Ms. Linda Ms. Acosta, worked for Salt Lake Regional 
Medical Center ("SLRMC") for approximately eighteen years from December, 
1980 through December, 1998. On approximately December 20, 1998, Ms. 
vii 
Acosta was lifting a baby out of an isolet to hand to its mother, when she 
experienced sudden, severe low back pain. Ms. Acosta filed an Application for 
Hearing with the Labor Commission for workers compensation benefits arising 
out of the December, 1998 industrial accident. The medical evidence adduced 
during the proceeding demonstrated that Ms. Acosta likely had pre-existing 
degenerative changes before her December 20, 1998 lifting event, although her 
low back was asymptomatic. At a hearing, the ALJ found that Ms. Acosta 
sustained an accident under a cumulative trauma theory of industrial accident. 
On appeal, the Labor Commission determined that because the cumulative 
trauma theory had not been plead, that the ALJ was barred from raising it sua 
sponte as a theory of recovery. The Labor Commission also held that Ms. Acosta 
was subject to the heightened standard of legal causation because she had an 
asymptomatic pre-existing condition. On appeal to this Court, this Court affirmed 
that the higher standard of causation applied to Ms. Acosta, and upheld the 
Commission's denial of compensation for industrial accident. 
On approximately August, 2002, Ms. Acosta filed a new Application for 
Hearing alleging injury by occupational disease under the Utah Occupational 
viii 
Disease Act.1 Ms. Acosta alleged different material facts than she plead in her 
industrial accident Application. She also alleged that those activities occurred 
over her eighteen years of employment with SLRMC. SLRMC filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim, and the ALJ granted its Motion. 
Petitioner appealed her denial of occupational disease claim to the Labor 
Commission, and the Commission denied Ms. Acosta's Motion for Review. The 
Commission held that Ms. Acosta's claims were bai u\i In the claim preclusion 
branch of the doctrine of res judicata. The < 0111 mission also held that applying 
the doctrine of claim preclusion served important public objectives that were 
(apparently) more important than liberally construing the Act in favor of providing 
compensation to injured workers. Ms. Acosta now appeals from the Labor 
Commission's Order Denying her Motion for Review. 
1
 Ms. Acosta also alleged injury by accident under a cumulative trauma 
claim. Ms. Acosta later elected not to pursue that claim, and it is not before this 
Court. 
IX 
FACTS 
On or around 3/26/99, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing for 
an industrial injury, she experienced at Salt Lake Regional Hospital 
on 12/20/98. The Application stated "I was lifting a baby out of an 
isolet to hand it to it's mother." See. Industrial Accident 
Application for Hearing, (Aplt App. at 1). 
On 2/25/99, Dr. Fotheringham examined Ms. Acosta on behalf of 
Respondents. Dr. Fotheringham stated that her 12/20/98 work injury 
"caused her current work symptoms," but noted that Ms. Acosta had 
significant pre-existing degeneration that contributed to her problems. 
MREat55 (Aplt App. at 29). 
On 3/5/99, Dr. Robert Hood opined that Ms. Acosta had no prior 
history of low back problems until her 12/20/98 work injury, and that 
Ms. Acosta had significant pre-existing stenosis that contributed to 
her problems. MRE at 58-9 (Aplt App. at 14-15). 
On 10/22/99, the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order awarding Workers Compensation benefits. 
On 11/17/99, Respondents filed a Motion for Review with the Labor 
x 
Commission. 
6. On 1/31/00, the Labor Commission issued a Order Granting 
Respondents Motion for Review, and reversed the ALJ's award of 
benefits to Petitioner. 
7. Petitioner appealed the Commission's Order to the Court of Appeals. 
8. The Court of Appeals upheld the Labor Commission's denial of 
benefits. The Utah Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for 
writ of certiorari. 
9. On or mom hi 8/26/02, Ms. Acosta filed a new Application for 
Hearing alleging injury by occupational disease. Ms. Acosta alleged 
that she was "lifting babies, assisting patients with activities of 
living, picking items up from the floor, and other activities." Ms. 
Acosta also alleged that this occurred over eighteen years of work 
with Respondents, from approximately 12/80 12/20/98. See, 
Application for Hearing, Occupational Disease (Aplt App at (>). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the Labor Commission and remand Ms. Acosta's 
occupational disease claim for a hearing on the merits. The Labor Commission 
errorounsly applied the doctrine of claimed preclusion to bar Ms. Acosta's 
occupational disease claim, because it believed that the Workers Compensation 
Act, and the Occupational Disease Act created only a single cause of action. Res 
judicata not only bars prelitigation of previously litgated claims, that arose from 
the same material facts. Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim was not subject 
to claimed preclusion because it had not been litigated, and did arise from the 
same material facts as her industrial accident. Utah law has always recognized 
that occupational disease claims are different from industrial accident claims. The 
Labor Commission treated these separate Acts as a single cause of action, and 
wrongly held that Ms. Acosta should have filed her occupational disease claim 
along with her industrial accident claim. Neither Act required Acosta to 
simultaneously file her claims. The Labor Commission collapsed the dual 
requirements under the Maoris & Associates case into a single requirement, 
contrary to establish law. The Labor Commission admitted plain legal error when 
xii 
it upheld the dismissal of Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim. Also, public 
policy favors treating the Acts separately, and to liberally construe Ms. Acosta's 
facts in favor of finding compensation. 
xiii 
ARGUMENT 
MS. ACOSTA'S OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIM WAS A 
DIFFERENT CLAIM FROM HER INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CLAIM 
BECAUSE IT AROSE FROM A SEPARATE STATUTES WITH 
DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS AND DIFFERENT COMPENSATION 
PAYABLE. AND THEREFORE WAS NOT BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION. 
This Court should find that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim is not 
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because her occupational disease claim 
was a different unlitigated claim from her industrial accident claim. The Labor 
Commission failed to recognize that occupational disease claims and industrial 
accidents arise from different statutes, with different requirements. The 
Commissions's failure to recognize the differences between the two claims led it 
to erroneously apply the doctrine of res judicata to bar Ms. Acosta's claims. 
Both the occupational disease act and the workers compensation act are 
statutory creations, and neither statute required injured workers to simultaneously 
file disease and accident claims against the same employer. Nor did claim 
preclusion bar Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim because her claim did not 
arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence" as her industrial accident. To the 
contrary, Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim arose under a separate statute 
with different material facts. Claim preclusion does not bar previously unlitigated 
claims that arose under different statutes with different material facts. Therefore, 
this Court should remand Ms. Acosta's case to the Labor Commission for a 
hearing on the merits. 
A. Res Judicata Only Bars Relitigation of Previously Litigated Claims 
Arising Out of the Same Material Facts. 
Generally, res judicata is judicially created doctrine that bars litigants from 
presenting the same claims or issues more than once. When applicable, the 
doctrine may bar either previously litigated claims or issues: 
Although the term "res judicata" is often used to describe 
the overall doctrine of preclusion, a distinction should 
properly be made between that branch of the doctrine 
which precludes the relitigation of previously decided 
claims, called either res judicata or claim preclusion, and 
that branch which precludes the relitigation of previously 
decided issues, known as either collateral estoppel.2 
In this case, the Commission concluded that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease 
claim was barred by res judicata or claim preclusion,3 and denied her occupational 
disease claim without a hearing on its merits. 
2
 Career Serv. Rev. Bd. v. Dept ofCorr.. 942 P.2D 936, 938 n.2 (citing 
Noble v. Noble. 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 n. 5 (Utah 1988). 
3
 Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Applications for Hearing, at 3, 
Appellate App. at 33. 
2 
R Ms. Acosta's Occupational Disease Claim Was Not Barred Because 
The Claim Preclusion Requirements Were Not Satisfied. 
Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim may proceed because her case did 
not satisfy the claim preclusion requirements. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
articulated the three claim preclusion requirements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred 
must have been presented in the first suit or must be 
one that could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. 
Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways. Inc.. 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 (emphasis added). 
The second requirement is also known as the "same claim" requirement. The 
"same claim" requirement can be satisfied in one of two ways: 1) by presenting the 
claim in the first hearing; or 2) if the claim "must" be one that both could have 
been raised, and should have been raised in the first hearing. Ms. Acosta did not 
present an occupational disease claim at the first hearing, therefore, her claim may 
only be barred now if she both "could have" and "should have" been raised at the 
first hearing. Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim may proceed unless 
Appellees can demonstrate that her claims met the "same claim" requirement. 
3 
C Occupational Disease Claims Have Always Been Recognized As 
Different From Industrial Accident Claims* And Are Not the "Same 
Claim." 
Utah law has always recognized that occupational disease claims and 
industrial accident claims are wholly different claims. After passing the UWCA in 
1917, injuries from industrial accidents were no longer governed by common law. 
Instead, industrial accident claims were the exclusive remedy for all accidental 
injuries between employees and their employers. Utah Courts recognized that 
only industrial accident claims were covered under the Act. In contrast, 
occupational disease claims were still common law claims that had to be brought 
in district court; the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction over occupational 
disease claims. See, e.g., Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (Utah 
1939) (holding lead poisoning from inhaling vaporized paint was occupational 
disease, thereby depriving Industrial Commission of jurisdiction over common law 
claim.) 
After the Utah legislature created the Utah Occupational Disease Act 
("UODA") in 1943, however, common law occupational disease claims ceased to 
exist. See, e.g., Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 
Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948) (holding common law occupational disease 
4 
claims abrogated by statutory occupational disease claims under UODA). History 
shows that even before occupational disease claims were codified in 1943, Utah 
law always recognized that occupational disease claims were different from 
industrial accident claims. Occupational disease claims have never been 
considered the "same claims" as industrial accident claims. 
IX Ms. Acosta Had No Duty To Simultaneouly File Different Claims 
Where Different Statutes Gave Rise To Different Causes Of Action. 
Ms. Acosta had no duty to file her occupational disease claim when she 
filed her industrial accident claim. There is no duty to simultaneously bring 
different claims that arise under different statutes. For example, in SMP v. 
Kirkland, Inc., 843 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah App. 1992), the doctrine of res judicata 
did not bar an employee from filing a later contractual offset claim arising under 
different statute. This Court reasoned that because "the claim adjudicated before 
the Industrial Commission was Kirkman's [claim for back wages] [while] [t]he 
claim adjudicated by the circuit court was SMP's [contractual offset claim]. It is 
readily apparent that the claims were not identical." Id. at 533. The claims were 
not identical because they arose under separate statutes with different 
requirements. Similarly, this Court should permit Ms. Acosta to bring her 
5 
occupational disease claim separately because it arose under a different statute 
with different requirements. 
Other courts have looked to the meaning and purpose of the statute in 
permitting separate statutory causes of action to proceed in different cases. For 
example, in Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F. 2d 125 (1971), an 
employee who litigated a wrongful termination claim was not barred from 
bringing a later claim that alleged discharge for discrimination, because the second 
claim arose under a different statute. The court reasoned that the separate statutes 
that prevented wrongful termination and discrimination were separate causes of 
action with separate requirements that served distinct and important public 
purposes. Id. It is well settled that claims arising under separate statutes need not 
be filed simultaneously where each statute requires separate material facts to state 
a claim. 
The same is true for Ms. Acosta: her separate occupational disease claim 
that arose out of a different statute and under different material facts was not 
barred by res judicata. In other words, the legislature has chosen to separate 
industrial accident claims and occupational disease claims, creating different 
requirements and different compensation for each cause of action; the Labor 
6 
Commission may not simply ignore the Legislature's decisions, and treat both 
Acts as giving rise to a single cause of action. 
R. Neither Statute Required Injured Workers To Simultaneously File 
Occupational Disease Claims And Industrial Accident Claims. 
Neither the Occupational Disease Act,4 nor the Workers' Compensation 
Act5 required injured workers to simultaneously bring both occupational disease 
and industrial accident claims. It is well settled that both Acts are governed by the 
language of their statutes, and the Commission is bound by the language contained 
in the Acts. The language of the Acts demonstrate that the legislature intended to 
keep the actions separate. 
The legislature has determined that industrial accidents occur at a discrete 
time and place, while occupational diseases occur gradually over time, such as 
4
 See generally, Utah Occupational Disease Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34A-3-101toll2. 
5
 See generally. Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34A-2-101,et. seq. 
7 
silicosis6 and asbestosis.7 The reporting requirements are different for industrial 
accidents and occupational diseases.8 Employer liability requirements are 
different for occupational diseases than industrial accidents.9 Benefits are 
statutorily apportioned for occupational diseases,10 but not for industrial accident 
claims. Occupational disease and industrial accident claims are disjunctive claims, 
and can not arise from the same material facts. Applicants are specifically barred 
from recovering for both industrial accident and occupational disease claims.11 
The statute bars one set of operative facts from giving rise to an injury that is both 
occupational disease and an industrial accident. Finally, neither act requires that 
injured workers simultaneously file occupational disease claims with industrial 
accident claims. Given the legislature's efforts to maintain separate requirements 
6
 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 115 Utah 
451,205P.2d541 (1949). 
7
 See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial 
Comm'iL 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987). 
8
 Compare Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407 with § 34A-3-108. 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105. 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110. 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 34-A-3-110(3). 
8 
and benefits for each type of claim, there was no statutory support for the 
Commission's conclusion that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim could have 
and should have been raised in her first application for hearing. 
R The Labor Commission's "Practices and Customs" Of Filing 
Alternative Claims Were Permissive. And Not Mandatory. And Did 
Not Justify Ms. Acosta's Dismissal On The Merits. 
» ' " ' ' . i. I, 
The Labor Commission's application for hearing forms did not permit 
alternative pleading when Ms. Acosta filed her first application. Ms. Acosta's 
application for hearing ("Form 001") was for "industrial accidents" only, not 
occupational diseases. Aplt. App. at 1. On its face, Form 001 did not permit 
injured workers to make alternative claims.12 The Commission nonetheless argued 
that it had a "custom and practice" of permitting injured workers to make 
alternative claims for diseases and accidents.13 Order at 3. Aplt. App. at 117. But 
even if there was an unarticulated practice of letting injured workers maintain 
alternative claims, it did not justify mandatory dismissal when Ms. Acosta filed 
12
 In July, 2001, over a year and a half after Ms. Acosta's first filing, the 
Commission revised its Form 001 to permit both industrial accidents and 
occupational diseases to be simultaneously plead. Aplt. App. at 9. 
13
 Apparently, this custom would only be available to those injured 
workers who knew they should ignore the restrictions on the Commission's forms. 
9 
her claim separately. The Commission's own forms did not permit alternative 
pleading, and there was no notice that failure to make alternative arguments would 
result in dismissal on the merits. There was no such requirement in the statutes or 
in the Commission's own rules, nor was it found on the Commission's own forms. 
G. Contrary to Utah Law. The Commission's Decision Erroneously 
Collapsed The "Could Have" and "Should Have" Requirements Into 
A Single "Could Have" Requirement. 
The Commission erroneously concluded that Ms. Acosta "should have" 
filed her occupational disease claim simply because she "could have" filed it 
earlier. Although the case law required the Commission to demonstrate that Ms. 
Acosta both "could have" and "should have" filed her occupational disease claim 
to later bar the claim under a claim preclusion theory, the Commission collapsed 
its analysis to a single "could have" requirement: 
In this case, Ms. Acosta had the opportunity in the first 
adjudicative proceeding to present all theories she 
believed supported her claim for benefits. She is not 
entitled to pursue her claim for benefits "through 
piecemeal litigation, offering one theory to the court 
while holding others in reserve." 
Order at 3. Aplt. App. at 117. In other words, because she "could have" raised 
her occupational disease claim earlier, she should have done so. 
10 
(11c ( \ >ni n 11ssio11 pIainly ignoi ed tl :ie "shoi lid 1 lave" reqi lirement i iiider 
Maoris & Assoc. 2000 UT at 93, 16 P.3d at 1214. But Ms. Acosta only "should 
have" earlier plead an occupational disease if that claim arose out of the same 
material facts, or if there was a statutory requirement to do so. As shown above, 
Ms. Acosta's claims arose from different material facts: Ms. Acosta did not need 
to raise her occupational disease claim where she had not plead facts that would 
give rise to an occ upatioi lal disease claii i i M.oreov ei , tl lei e \ v as no statutory, 
regulatory, or of 11<; i I .11 Mi ' 11111 n 11 ,s in11 i aj11irement that T\ Is \ costa 
simultaneously plead all possible claims. The Labor Commission's failure to 
analyze the "should have" requirement for claim preclusion demonstrated that it 
failed to properly apply the law in dismissing Ms. Acosta's case. This Court 
should find that Ms. Acosta had no duty to simultaneously file her occupational 
disease claim along with her industrial accident claim. 
11 
H. This Court Should Hold That Ms. Acosta Had No Duty To File Her 
Occupational Disease Claim When She Filed Her Industrial Accident 
Claim And That Claim Preclusion Did Not Apply To Her Facts. But 
That Even If It Did, Public Policy Requires The Commission To 
Liberally Construe Ms. Acosta's Case In Favor Of Finding 
Compensation. 
This Court should hold that Ms. Acosta had no duty to file her separate 
occupational disease claim when she filed her industrial accident claim. The 
legislature chose to create two separate causes of action for work injuries -
occupational diseases and industrial accidents - with separate requirements and 
separate compensation. Until and unless the legislature creates a single statute for 
work injuries, or otherwise subsumes these separate statutes, the Commission can 
not treat these claims as a single cause of action. This Court should interpret these 
Acts consistent with Utah's stated public policies that favor liberal construction to 
provide compensation for injured workers.14 As separate causes of action, there 
was no basis for the Commission to apply claim preclusion, and this Court should 
remand Ms. Acosta's claim to the Commission for a hearing on the merits. 
14
 See. Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc.. 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 
2000) ("The purpose of the Act is to provide relief from industrial accidents. To 
that end, we construe the Act liberally and in favor of coverage if the statutes 
reasonably permit.")(internal citations omitted). 
12 
Bi it even i:l 'claii i i preclusioi i coi ild apj:: 1) tc Ms \ c -osta's facts, this Coi irt 
should find that it did not. This Court should apply the test set forth in Maoris & 
Assoc, and hold that Ms. Acosta had no duty to filed her occupational disease 
claim when she filed her industrial accident claim. She "should [not] have" filed 
an occupational disease claim because that claim arose from separate material 
facts, apart from her industrial accident claim. 
Ms. Acosta's facts demonstrate tl mt il woi ild be ui iji :is1 1 .0 appl> elan n 
preclusion to bar 1 ler occupational disease claim. '• \ • \ - • * as exan lined 
Ms. Acosta case attributed her injuries to her woik wiin appellees.15 The AJUJ ui 
her industrial accident case awarded benefits based on cumulative trauma, but the 
Commission reversed because Ms. Acosta had not articulated that specific theory 
of industrial accident - not because her injuries were unrelated to her work with 
Appellees. Ms. Acosta's facts demonstrate the importance of fulfilling the public 
policy and purpose of the workers compensation statutes, rather tllan adhering to 
technical ' ; serve 01 f off clair^ r 10' ^-\•!••••. -v - '-13. 
Acosta's case should be decided on its merits, and not dismissed on a technicality. 
Facts Tjf 2-3. 
13 
The case law demonstrates that res judicata should not be applied when it 
thwarts public policy. For example, in Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc.,™ the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that res judicata should be rejected when its application 
would contravene overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice. In that 
case, an applicant who applied for total disability benefits from silicosis and was 
denied, was not later barred from presenting the same claim where his condition 
had materially worsened. The Court emphasized the important public policy 
underlying its workers compensation statutes, and refused to apply res judicata to 
bar the applicants' claim: 
[Fundamental fairness should dictate such a result. 
While res judicata does apply to administrative 
proceedings , it should be applied with flexibility. The 
doctrine would be qualified or rejected when its 
application would contravene an overriding public policy 
or result in manifest injustice. . . . Fundamental fairness 
requires that such a claim be determined on its facts, not 
on legal technicalities. This result is consistent with this 
state's public policy of construing the law liberally in 
favor of injured employees.17 
16
 529 N.E.2d 1255, (Ohio 1988) (injured worker's previously 
adjudicated claim for total disability for silicosis did not bar later claim for total 
disability). 
17
 L± at 1259 (citations omitted). 
14 
Simpl)/ put, i ules of judi.ci.aJ coi isti i ictiol 11 i 11 ist > ield to the ii nportai it public policy 
underlying the workers' compensatioi :i statutes. The interest in promoting judicial 
economy by avoiding additional hearings is far outweighed by denying injured 
workers lifetime benefits without a hearing on the merits of their claims. 
The Commission did not weigh the interests at stake; it simply concluded 
that claim preclusion served "vital public interests." Order at 4, Aplt. App. at 118. 
The Commission concluded that its decision would "merely leqiine that parties 
present all their available claim* ,tiul defenses at OIH4 tune," even if il was nnl 
required, by eithei ? \ ct I d. Wl lile this n lay be an admirable legislative goal, the 
Commission is still bound by both Acts, and neither presently require mandatory 
simultaneous filings as contemplated by the Commission. This Court should 
reverse the Commission and hold that there is no simultaneous filing requirement, 
and remand Ms. Acosta's claim to the Commission for a hearing on the merits. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
i nib Co\:- should reverse the Labor Commission, and remand Ms. Acosta's 
occupational disease claim for a hearing on the merits. Occupational disease 
claims are separate statutory creations from industrial accident claims. The 
legislature has kept these claims separate and Ms. Acosta had no duty to 
simultaneously file these claims. This Court should hold that as separate claims, 
claim preclusion does not apply to , is. Acosta's facts. -; • • -:\. . - i . t 
preclu ••-.: apply, n \ •: - AV ;!K . ••••-, i 
to Ms. Av. -)sta's facts, these reasons, uii:•* *• •" ->' reverse . ? .! JI 
Commission, and remand Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim to the 
Commission for a hearing on the merits. 
DATED this ^ f d a y of February, 2004. 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP. P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
A ttorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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